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Making their revolution "stick" is, of course, the goal of all revolutionaries. Put more formally, their objective is to institutionalize the revolution, translate plans into actions, and even make dreams into realities. Institutionalization of the revolution ensures that it is without serious challengers-its position is hegemonic. However, hegemony is not achievable overnight. So how do revolutionaries make a revolution stick?
To begin, the revolutionaries themselves have to make some important changes in their behavior and outlook. In a sense, they have to make the same adjustments as any political group that graduates from opposition to government. At its simplest, that means they have to do more than say "We can do it better," because now they are in charge of the polity and responsible for the fate of the nation. However, revolutionaries have to undertake more dramatic shifts than most opposition groups, simply because they are revolutionaries whose platform is to bring about dramatic reforms. Substantive overhauls of a political system are never without costs nor are they easily achieved. They require patience, substantial administrative capacity, and, usually, great negotiating skills. Revolutionaries may have the first in abundance but the latter two are traits that need not have been demonstrated by those who lead revolutions.
Besides the behavioral and attitudinal realignments, revolutionaries who become rulers also need to lay a firm and complex political foundation before the revolution can become a country's unquestioned regime. This latter process consists of setting up formal structures and processeseconomic, political, and social-without which the big changes needed to make the revolution hegemonic either simply will not happen or will take place so painfully slowly that, to most people, the revolutionary project starts looking like just another government. Making it to power does not end a revolution, rather it starts the work of "making the revolution stick."
As we the editors of this volume all teach political science, we put special emphasis on the political machinery of revolutions. Nevertheless, we recognize that not all aspects of that machinery are equally important and, even more, that it is simply impossible to canvass all the apparatus of revolutionary government in one book. Thus, the broad purpose of this book is to look at how some revolutionaries constructed and used the political instrument known as the "organizational weapon"-the political party. Its narrower objective is to examine how a selection of late-twentieth-century revolutionary movements from Latin America and Africa went about turning themselves into political parties. However, our specific focus is on not parties in general but parties that contest reasonably open elections, ones that they can lose as well as win. Although this book includes cases of revolutionary parties that govern effectively one-party states, they are included principally to highlight the differences between them and our real center of attention.
Besides all teaching politics, we have another characteristic in common: all of us have worked extensively in and on Nicaragua. Having followed the fate of the Sandinistas over several decades, we wanted to know if their experience was unique. The Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN, Sandinista National Liberation Front) went from guerrilla movement to revolutionary junta to elected government to electoral opposition, all between 1979 and 1990 . From 1990 until 2006 , the party has been the largest opposition party in the Legislature and the runner-up in presidential elections. It has fared better on the municipal front yet national power
